in TVFs MetaModel
My view is that time had a beginning, as did space, and that there is only one fundamental scale of existence. His view is that time has no beginning, space has no beginning and there are an infinite number of scales on which existence is played out.
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A mechanical model is one consisting of objects which interact by contact in a logically consistent manner. There are no strictly "logical interactions", i.e. interactions which are acausal from a mechanical perspective. Yet that is what parity non-conservation shows in the weak interaction. There can be no mechanical cause for it in principle. What we are given is a case where nature shows a preference for left over right when no mechanical differentiation is logically possible. Hence, something must inevitably be added to MM to account for what is mechanically acausal. The only way to evade such a situation while staying within the confines of MM is to postulate another part of the universe (which is not accessible) that takes the opposite hand thus restoring the logical equivalence of left and right. But such a postulate is as theoretically evasive as a "many worlds" hypothesis which handles problems by postulating any number of corrective universes for any number of theoretical problems. This is not a trivial problem because it opens the "floodgates" to all manner of irrational ideas. Yet, one is forced to open the sluice and deal with all the floating crap that one, at first, thought could be kept out of a rational mechanical world. A detailed examination of existence is more like wading through vomit up to one's armpits than doing carpentry, plumbing and auto body repair. Hence, few are interested in looking too closely.
Parity can never be a "function of scale" ... it is a function of geometrical logic ... not physics. That there should be as much leftness as rightness is one of the "constraints" on any physics model (unless one postulates to the contrary). It means the same thing on every scale. On the galactic scale there is no known problem with this rule ... just in weak particle interactions. You can imagine a handed twist in a standard model field but I don't think that MM can produce any analogous construct other than by a chance assembly of MIs. Now, if you put odd shaped "hooks" and such on particles (ala Democritus) ... some would have a handedness. However, they would have an equal chance of being left or right handed. I don't think you want to go down that road anyway. ;o)
I agree that there could be handed galaxies and molecules. But that's not the problem. Such handed constructs with many of the same handedness would be just a statistical fluke. The parity violation of the weak interaction is not a statistical fluke ... it is the embodiment of a law of nature. But such a violation (predictable in every repetition of appropriate experiments), cannot be statistical else experiments would result in equally probable left-right results. This eliminates mechanical models because "all mechanical models are, at base, causal". But the choice of left over right is necessarily acausal because there is no quantitative difference between left and right upon which to base a "choice". Hence, one must postulate another universe to balance out our ingrained requirement for causality ... or ... we may postulate another part of this universe where the phenomena are reversed so as to yield the balancing results. However, if we postulate either of the above ... our postulate is rooted in acausality. For the handed events (if they were considered a statistical fluke) would be an outrageous affront to our statistical expectations ... an affront perhaps even greater than that to our causality requirement. Imagine fair coins being tossed billions of times and all coming up heads. What would we think of this? We could not accept it as chance. We would seek a "cause" for the incredible string of heads. And ... finding none ... we would have to propose that causality was somehow, someway violated. The parity violation of the weak interaction demands that one give up statistics and/or causality. One of them must go (as an absolute) and one must open those floodgates. Certainly statistics and causality are valid perhaps everywhere else, but a single place where they are routinely violated must stick in anyone's craw. It certainly did for me.
I brought up a specific quantum issue in the other forum about parity being a "logical" constraint on any cosmological model of existence. The general problem I have with MM is that other quantum properties seem to preclude the possibility that individual particles have constituents assembled like matter accreting to form a planet (ala MM). Thus, all electrons are alike to the greatest accuracy of measurement possible whereas MM would postulate that they are not "identical" but merely "almost identical" ... and ... if we could but see down to a sufficiently small level, we would note small differences due to their constituent particles (MIs). Also, as a matter of principle (as I understand it), no "scale" of existence is logically hidden from our observation, i.e. given an enormous increase in our technological competence, we could peer down to whatever depths and make quantitative observations. Note that this is a "logical" principle of MM. It doesn't mean that we ever will peer down to any particular level but simply that we are not forbidden by any logical constraint. This is not true of the Standard Model and perhaps is not true of any model which posits a beginning. The question I would then put to MM is this: If the quantum parameters of the Standard Model are not "logically" viable ... but only statistically viable as in MM ... why do they so accurately account for the behavior of matter? A case in point would be Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics and Leibniz' principle of the "Identity of Indiscernibles" which bears upon such statistics. Here, particles which are "logically" identical to one another give rise to different statistical properties than if they were just "almost identical" as in MM.
It would appear that MM cannot call two particles identical in the absolute sense because each MI in such a universe is known to every other ... and ... no particle could be considered "fundamental" in any absolute sense ... and therefore cannot be "identical" ... and therefore should show no predisposition to behave in accordance with the relevant statistics. I regard this a a major hole in MM. To me, it is not that MM hasn't gotten that far yet. It's that it has no "road" to get there, in principle, by it's fundamental design.
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